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ABSTRACT 
 
INTERGROUP SOLIDARITY IN PEACE ACTIVISM: THE POTENTIAL FOR 
SUCCESS OR BACKLASH 
FEBRUARY 2017 
THOMAS C. O’BRIEN, A.B, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Linda R. Tropp 
 
Integrating theory on distinct modes of social identity (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & 
Eidelson, 2008) with group-based emotion in protracted conflict (Halperin & Pilskin, 
2015) and exposure to outgroups (Saguy & Halperin, 2014), this dissertation tests how 
Jewish Israelis respond when ingroup members and outgroup members work together to 
advocate for peaceful solutions to conflict (i.e., intergroup solidarity), and how 
glorification of one’s national group moderates these responses. Instructing participants 
to imagine a peace activist organization, Study 1 shows evidence that glorification of 
one’s ingroup predicts more anger, less hope, and less support for a political solution 
reflecting compromise. With a student sample, Study 2 shows that learning about an 
activist organization where both groups work together, relative to an organization where 
ingroup members work alone, increases support for allowing the organization to present 
on campus by reducing anger and increasing hope. Manipulating both group composition 
and the target of criticism, Study 3 shows that glorification becomes less predictive of 
negative responses to activism when the activist organization consists of only ingroup 
 vi 
members, and when both ingroup members and outgroup members are criticized for their 
role in the conflict.
 vii 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Activists trying to end intergroup conflict must elicit public support (Subašić, 
Reynolds, & Turner, 2008), as any sustainable solution to the conflict will rely on it. 
Understanding the effectiveness of different strategies for eliciting public support is thus 
critical for activists and, ultimately, any party seeking to end intergroup conflict. 
Activists advocating an end to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often adopt the strategy of 
intergroup solidarity, whereby both groups -- Jewish Israelis and Palestinians -- work 
together to denounce past violence and advocate a permanent political solution that 
brings peace (see Nasie, Bar-Tal, & Shnaidman; see also Perry, 2011). For example, the 
group Combatants for Peace is an organization of Jewish Israelis and Palestinians who 
“believe that only through joint action can we (Palestinians and Israelis) break the cycle 
of violence and put an end to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories” 
(Combatants for Peace, 2016).   This demonstrates a powerful form of indirect contact for 
members of the public witnessing activism (e.g., Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & 
Ropp, 1997); these activists who engage in intergroup solidarity provide an example for 
other Israelis and Palestinians demonstrating that members of both groups want peace 
and are willing to work together to achieve it.  
Whereas this strategy reflects an intuitive understanding of psychological theory 
on promoting harmonious relations between groups (see Vezzali, Hewstone, Capozza, 
Giovannini, & Wölfer, 2014), other psychological perspectives could predict that 
exposure to such examples of intergroup solidarity would have the opposite effect. 
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Generally, people want to view ingroups that are important to them in a positive light 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and as moral (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007).  In arguing for 
a change in relations between Israelis and Palestinians, activists are defying the 
traditional norms and authority of the ingroup, and could also imply that the ingroup’s 
policies and actions are, to some extent, to blame for the conflict. Both of these could 
result in aversive reactions from ingroup members (Schacter, 1951; Tajfel & Turner, 
1986; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Eidelson, 2008), especially if interpreted as forsaking 
the interests of the ingroup to join an outgroup with whom one’s group is in conflict 
(Travagilino et al., 2014). 
 Thus, the primary question guiding my dissertation is when intergroup solidarity 
will elicit public support and when it will elicit backlash. More specifically, the research 
presented in this dissertation tests whether intergroup solidarity in the context of peace 
activism may elicit support or backlash relative to activism enacted by only ingroup 
members or outgroup members, how glorification of the ingroup could moderate whether 
intergroup solidarity elicits support or backlash, and how the target of activists’ criticism 
determines whether intergroup solidarity elicits support or backlash.  
How Indirect Contact and Exposure to Outgroups Can Enhance Intergroup 
Relations  
Research suggests that crossing group boundaries can have positive outcomes for 
intergroup relations (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011). 
Positive, indirect contact with outgroup members – that is, knowledge of ingroup 
members having positive contact with outgroup members – can promote more positive 
beliefs about those outgroups and support for behaviors that improve intergroup relations 
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(Vezzali et al., 2014; Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). Indirect contact 
improves intergroup relations in part by promoting more positive beliefs about the norms 
that guide how the ingroup relates to the outgroup and vice versa (Turner, Hewstone, 
Voci, & Vonofakou, 2008; Wright et al., 1997).   
 Beyond indirect contact, mere exposure to outgroups expressing views that either 
promote positive relations with the ingroup (Leshem, Klare, & Flores, 2016; O’Brien, 
Leidner, & Tropp, in press) or that show the ability to be critical of the ingroup (Saguy & 
Halperin, 2014) can enhance positive outcomes.  Such exposure to outgroups has been 
shown to have a positive impact even in a context of protracted conflict; for example, 
Jewish Israelis who watched a video of a Palestinian expressing hope for the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict to end also expressed more hope for the conflict ending (Leshem et 
al., 2016). When people living in a context of protracted conflict learned about members 
of the outgroup with whom they are in conflict critiquing their own group (e.g., Israelis 
learning about Palestinians criticizing Palestinians), they became more open to learning 
about the outgroup’s perspective (Saguy & Halperin, 2014).  Knowledge of ingroup and 
outgroup members working together as activists to improve intergroup relations could 
therefore represent a powerful form of exposure demonstrating that members of both 
groups want peace and can work together toward that goal.  
Responses to Intergroup Solidarity: The Role of Ingroup Identification  
 Still, how people respond to ingroup and outgroup members working together is 
likely to depend on how they identify with their groups.  As the ingroup becomes 
psychologically important, identification motivates people to view the ingroup in 
particular ways (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The more strongly people identify with their 
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groups, the more they see the group as part of their own self-concept (Tropp & Wright, 
2001), and the more important it is to view the ingroup in this positive light (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). People also look to their groups to fulfill needs for understanding and 
navigating the world (Correll & Park, 2005; Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, & Grada, 
2006; Schacter, 1951). These needs become especially felt and thus groups become 
especially important in contexts of protracted intergroup conflict, as people cling more 
strongly to their groups as a resource for guiding intergroup relations and behavior (Bar-
Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012).  
One strategy for fulfilling the motivation to view the ingroup in a positive light is 
blinding ourselves to evidence of the contrary, denying or downplaying the importance of 
information that conflicts with a positive image of the ingroup (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, 
& Eidelson, 2008; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  People also want to view the ingroup as 
cohesive (Correll & Park, 2005; Schachter, 1951). The more important our groups are to 
us, the more we want to see our ingroups as groups of people similar to one another with 
common goals (Lickel et al., 2000). When people want to see their ingroups as unified, 
they reject those who violate group norms (Schachter, 1951), and stronger identification 
with their groups can lead people to reject deviant group members (Hutchison, Abrams, 
& de Moura, 2013).  Along with enhancing group identification, contexts of protracted 
conflict are likely to increase the importance of viewing one’s ingroup as unified (Bar-
Tal et al., 2012).  
In conflict settings, by advocating for changes to the nature of intergroup relations 
and ingroup policies to be more amicable toward an outgroup, ingroup activists are 
deviating from group norms and authorities, thereby representing divergence among 
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ingroup members and potentially invoking criticism of how the ingroup handles relations 
with the outgroup. To the extent that group members seek to avoid negative information 
about the group and reject ingroup deviance, they should react with backlash to activists 
rather than supporting their efforts.  
How People Identify with the Ingroup Determines the Consequences of 
Identification 
 More specifically, whether people welcome or reject both groups working 
together in solidarity for peace activism to end intergroup conflict may ultimately depend 
on how they identify with the ingroup.  Different ways of identifying with ingroups can 
have destructive or constructive outcomes for intergroup relations (e.g., Kosterman & 
Feshbach, 1989; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Eidelson, 2008). The differentiation 
between ingroup glorification and attachment (e.g., Roccas et al., 2008) is especially 
relevant for understanding how people react to intergroup solidarity, because this kind of 
activism challenges group members’ reverence for the ingroup’s norms and intergroup 
behaviors, and could also present a moral challenge to their view of the ingroup.  
 Glorifiers believe that the ingroup is superior and that its members should defer to 
ingroup norms, institutions, and leaders (Roccas et al., 2008). Glorifiers meet their need 
to view the ingroup in a positive light by deploying defense mechanisms to delegitimize 
any evidence that contradicts the positive image they have of their ingroup. For example, 
when glorifiers learn about outgroup victims tortured at the hands of ingroup members, 
they dehumanize those victims and demand less punishment of ingroup perpetrators than 
when they learn about outgroup victims tortured at the hand of outgroup members 
(Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Thus, rather than advocating for 
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changes within the ingroup, glorifiers reject any evidence of the group needing to address 
immoral behavior.  
 In contrast to glorification, attachment involves care for and commitment to the 
ingroup (Roccas et al., 2008). To the extent that people feel attached to, but not inclined 
to glorify, their ingroup, their motivation to view the ingroup in a positive light does not 
necessarily blind them to the ingroup’s flaws. Rather, acknowledgement of ingroup 
shortcomings could actually motivate people to address injustices the ingroup has 
committed (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatin, 2006).  
Taken together, these trends suggest that group members will likely show 
different responses to intergroup solidarity depending on how they identify with their 
groups.  Glorifiers should be sensitive to activism generally, because activists defy the 
norms and authorities of the ingroup.  Moreover, glorifiers should be especially sensitive 
to activism that takes the form of both groups working together (i.e., intergroup 
solidarity), as the notion that change is needed could threaten their view of the ingroup as 
superior. 
Backlash or Support?  
Research has yet to test how both of these processes – glorification with groups 
and indirect exposure to other groups – may jointly contribute to predicting group 
members’ responses to intergroup solidarity.  In contrast to observing ingroup members 
or outgroup members working on their own, seeing the groups work together in solidarity 
for peace to end intergroup conflict could elicit either backlash or support. On the one 
hand, both groups working together to reduce the conflict could constitute a powerful 
form of indirect exposure to outgroups demonstrating the potential for more positive 
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relations between the groups (Saguy & Halperin, 2014; Wright et al., 1997). On the other 
hand, learning about ingroup members who are working together with outgroup members 
could conflict with group members’ motivations to view their ingroups as unified (e.g., 
Bar-Tal et al, 2012; Lickel et al., 2000) and could elicit negative reactions reflecting 
backlash, particularly among those who glorify their groups. Thus, the present research 
tests whether intergroup activist organizations elicit support versus backlash, whether 
divergent levels of support vs. backlash to activist organizations of these different group 
compositions depend upon the extent to which participants glorify their ingroup, and 
whether the target of the activist organization’s criticism (criticizing primarily the 
ingroup or both groups) moderates divergent responses to organizations of different 
group compositions.    
How Emotions Predict Responses to Intergroup Solidarity: Anger and Hope as 
Mediators 
Moreover, the present research examines how these factors may elicit emotions 
such as anger and hope, and how these emotions may guide group members’ responses to 
intergroup solidarity.  Group-based emotions have particular relevance in settings of 
protracted intergroup conflict, as they direct people to support group actions that could 
enhance or reduce the conflict (Halperin & Pilskin, 2015). When group identity is salient, 
people who view their ingroup as strong are more prone to feel anger on behalf of their 
group and express intentions to act aggressively towards outgroups (Mackie, Devos, & 
Smith, 2000). Activism to end intergroup conflict should make social identity salient. As 
they revere deference to ingroup norms and authorities (Roccas et al., 2008), those who 
strongly glorify the ingroup should be especially likely to react with anger towards 
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activism supporting a peaceful end to the conflict, as activists are, by definition, 
challenging deference. The link between anger and glorification is consistent with past 
research linking anger to group-based provocations among high glorifiers (Steele, Parker, 
& Lickel, 2015). The link between anger directed at activists and opposition to their goals 
is consistent with research in the Israeli context showing that anger is related to more 
negative attitudes towards those advocating peace with Palestinians (perceiving them as 
less wise and less patriotic), the general goal of resolving conflict with Palestinians, and 
the specific solutions to achieve it (Kahn, Liberman, Halperin, & Ross, 2016)2. If 
glorifiers react to activists with anger, this may be particularly acute when those activists 
are engaging in intergroup solidarity, as joining with outgroup members violates ingroup 
norms and authority to a stronger extent than other forms of activism.  
Those who do not strongly glorify the ingroup should instead be less resistant to 
defiance of ingroup norms and authorities (Roccas et al., 2008). Since they are not as 
bound to viewing the ingroup as superior and revering deference to it, those who do not 
strongly glorify the ingroup should react with less anger to intergroup solidarity than 
those who do glorify the ingroup. For those low in glorification, in the absence of anger, 
intergroup solidarity may result in more hope as it demonstrates a powerful form of 
positive exposure to outgroups (e.g., Leshem et al., 2016; Saguy & Halperin, 2014).   
In contrast to anger, hope entails thinking abstractly beyond what is happening in 
the present (Bar-Tal, 2001; Isen, 2002; Snyder, 2002; Jarymowicz & Bar-Tal, 2006). 
Even in a context of protracted conflict, hope for better relations between an ingroup and 
an outgroup can make people more receptive to learning about the outgroup’s perspective 
(Saguy & Halperin, 2014), and can lead to support for actions that will enhance positive 
  9 
relations between the ingroup and outgroup (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 
2014). Thus, to the extent that glorification involves deference and viewing the group as 
superior, lower levels of glorification should be associated with greater hope, and a 
greater openness to hearing the activists’ message, and perhaps even eliciting support for 
political solutions to the conflict.  
Research Goals and Hypotheses 
 The overarching goal of this dissertation is to examine whether peace activism in 
the form of intergroup solidarity provokes support or backlash among ingroup members, 
and the role of glorification of the ingroup in moderating these effects. Below, in Figure 
1, I present the overall conceptual model for the series of studies, in which I predict that 
the extent to which people glorify their ingroup should determine whether intergroup 
solidarity in peace activism should provoke support or backlash.  I propose that those 
who glorify their ingroup strongly should react more negatively towards activism in 
general, and particularly towards activism involving intergroup solidarity, because they 
will feel more anger and less hope in response to learning about members from both 
groups working together.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual model: Intergroup solidarity should predict support among those 
low in glorification, and backlash among those high in glorification.  
 
 
Activism and Intergroup Solidarity in the Israeli-Palestinian Context 
 These issues will be examined in the unique context of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  Specifically, this dissertation research will test whether Jewish Israelis show 
support for or backlash against peace activist organizations that represent intergroup 
solidarity among Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, relative to their support for 
organizations that include only Jewish Israelis (ingroup members). The protracted nature 
of the conflict makes it a salient feature of daily life for people who live in this context 
(Bar-Tal, 2007; Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998). The threat of violence, in some form, is 
always present.  Still, there are groups of Israelis and Palestinians who demonstrate, often 
in solidarity with one another, against policies and actions they see as exacerbating the 
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conflict (see Nasie et al., 2014; see also Perry, 2011). What follows below is a brief 
summary of factors that are particularly important for understanding how peace activists 
are trying to change opinions about the conflict among Jewish Israelis.  
 The sense of threat and victimhood that influences Jewish Israelis’ beliefs about 
the conflict is about far more than relations between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians 
(Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992; Vollhardt, 2009; Schori-Eyal, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2014). The 
founding of the modern state of Israel in 1948 came after centuries of persecution of 
Jewish people around the world, three years after the surrender of Nazi Germany to 
Allied powers and the ending of the Holocaust. Scholars have argued that this history 
enhances a mindset that bleeds into the relationship between Jewish Israelis and 
Palestinians (e.g., Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a; Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992b).  
 Israel’s relations with the broader Middle East, between the founding of the state 
and through the 20th century, also enhances a mindset that often provokes defensive 
attitudes regarding the conflict with Palestinians (e.g., Bar-Tal & Antebi, 1992a; Bar-Tal 
& Antebi, 1992b). Israel and neighboring Arab states engaged in several wars between 
the founding of the modern state and the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and 
Israel in 1978.  Most consequential for political solutions posed for the conflict today are 
the 1948 and 1967 wars. The major implications of the former included (1) the expulsion 
of Palestinians from their homes in what is now Israel, part of the first stage in creating 
the Palestinian refugee crisis, and (2) the prevailing of Israel in the face of attacks by 
neighboring Arab states. The major implications of the six-day war of 1967 include the 
occupation of the East Jerusalem and the West Bank from Jordan, as well as Gaza from 
Egypt (Cleveland, 2004). Thus, when people refer to a two-state solution defined by the 
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“1967” lines, it refers to allowing a Palestinian state in East Jerusalem, the West Bank, 
and Gaza.  Whereas both Egypt and Jordan have signed peace treaties with Israel, to 
some extent, the conflict still involves other players in the Middle East (Kelman, 2007).  
 Policymakers and activists within Israel – as well as international organizations 
and foreign governments – have proposed several options as permanent solutions to end 
the conflict. Some of these solutions reflect a resistance to having the Jewish Israeli 
ingroup make compromises, such as a one-state solution in which Israel remains a Jewish 
State (either with some Palestinians still living there, or from which all Palestinians must 
leave to neighboring Arab states). Other proposed solutions reflect a willingness among 
Jewish Israelis to compromise, such as a two-state solution that would create an 
independent Palestine (see Kelman, 2007). For example, the organization Combatants for 
Peace, a joint Israeli and Palestinian activist organization, advocates for a two-state 
solution based on the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capitol of the independent 
Palestine (e.g., Combatants for Peace, 2016). Some also argue for a binational state in 
which Jewish Israelis and Palestinians would have equal rights, a solution that would 
greatly empower Palestinians from their current status (see Habib, 2016; see also Rumely 
& Tibon, 2015).  
The Oslo Accords, signed in 1993, were meant to bring about a permanent 
solution. Whereas the Accords temporarily brought hope, continued violence following 
the accords brought about skepticism with the peace process (see Perlmutter, 1995; 
Shikaki, 1998; and Zogby Research Services, 2013). Frustration with the accords’ failure 
to bring about a permanent solution led to the second Intifada, an uprising far more 
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violent than the first. Erupting in 2001, the Second Intifada created a wave of violence 
between Israelis and Palestinians (Sharoni & Abu-Nimer, 2013).  
Presently, peace activists have to argue for a change in Israeli policies to a 
generation that has seen past efforts towards peace fail, who have witnessed suicide 
bombings, and many of whom may have had family members killed or injured in the 
conflict. Indeed, the distress and sense of threat that exposure to political violence brings 
on can generally increase resistance to making compromises in the conflict (Canetti, 
Elad-Strenger, Lavi, Guy, & Bar-Tal, 2015). Moreover, the memories of violence and the 
threat of future violence is especially likely to make many people cling to their group 
identities, making them less willing to accept messages that threaten the positive and 
unified image of their ingroup (Bar-Tal et al., 2012).  
Overview of Research Studies 
 Informed by the ongoing conflict, this dissertation examines how Jewish Israelis 
respond to intergroup solidarity for peace between Jewish Israelis and Palestinians, by 
testing how (a) the group composition of activist organizations and (b) how people 
identify with their ingroup (glorification) impact their support for or backlash against 
activist organizations seeking to end the conflict. More specifically, with a national 
sample of Jewish Israelis, Study 1 tested how people would react to an activist 
organization composed of both ingroup and outgroup members (i.e., intergroup 
solidarity), as compared to one composed exclusively of ingroup members, or one 
composed exclusively of outgroup members, and whether participants’ levels of 
glorification moderated their responses to political solutions to the conflict. With a 
student sample, Study 2 tested how the group composition of activist organizations and 
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levels of glorification predicted both responses to political solutions to the conflict and 
students’ support for activist organizations on campus to express their views.  Returning 
to a national sample, Study 3 examined more precisely how Jewish Israelis would 
respond to the group composition of activist organizations depending on whether these 
organizations were explicitly critical of both groups, or only of the ingroup, and also 
whether the effects of group composition and target of criticism depended upon levels of 
glorification. 
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CHAPTER 2  
STUDY 1 
Study 1 Introduction 
 Study 1 sought to test whether an activist organization composed of both ingroup 
members and outgroup members would elicit higher levels of anger, lower levels of hope, 
and consequently lower levels of support for political solutions reflecting compromise 
than an activist organization composed of only ingroup members, or only outgroup 
members. The main goal of Study 1 was to determine how group composition of the 
activist organization would affect participants’ emotions and support for political 
solutions depending upon the degree to which they glorified the ingroup. I predicted that 
those who scored high on glorification would react most negatively (i.e., with higher 
levels of anger, lower levels of hope, less support for political solutions reflecting 
compromise and more support for political solutions empowering the ingroup) to an 
intergroup activist organization, as compared to the other conditions. In contrast, I 
hypothesized that those who scored low on glorification would react most receptively, by 
showing less anger, more hope, more support for political solutions reflecting 
compromise, and less support for political solutions that would give power to the 
ingroup. To test these hypotheses, I conducted an experiment asking participants to 
imagine a peace activist organization, assigning them randomly to conditions in which 
the organization included a combination of ingroup members and outgroup members 
working together (intergroup solidarity condition), only ingroup members (ingroup 
condition), or only outgroup members (outgroup condition). 
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Study 1 Methods 
Participants and Procedure 
 A between-participants experiment with three conditions tested these hypotheses 
with Jewish Israeli adults recruited through the online service Midgam 
(http://www.midgam.com/).   
Participants were asked to imagine one of three peace activist organizations: one in which 
members of the organization are exclusively Jewish Israeli (ingroup condition), one in 
which members of the organization are exclusively Palestinian (outgroup condition), and 
one that includes Jewish Israeli and Palestinian peace activists working together in 
solidarity (intergroup solidarity condition). Besides descriptions of the group membership 
of the activist organizations (Jewish Israeli, Palestinian, or both), the text describing the 
goals and work of each peace activist organization was held constant across conditions. 
The English version of the manipulation is below: 
We would like for you to imagine a peace activist organization that consists of (Jewish 
Israelis/Palestinians/Jewish Israelis and Palestinians working together).  This group uses 
non-violent methods to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians. It works with 
other Israeli organizations using non-violence, but it is not working with any Palestinian 
organizations, and only Jewish Israelis belong to the organization.  
 
 At the end of the study, participants were asked to respond to a multiple choice 
question regarding the group composition of the peace activist organization about which 
they read, as an attention check for the experimental manipulation. Of 159 Jewish Israeli 
adults who completed the study, 31 did not pass the attention check, incorrectly stating 
the group composition of the activist organization they were asked to imagine, including 
nine in the ingroup condition, seven in the intergroup condition, and 17 in the outgroup 
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condition. These exclusions left a total of 126 participants, Including 64 males and 62 
females (ages 18-72; M = 39.61, SD = 14.27).  Analyses yielded similar results whether 
excluding or not excluding the 31 participants who did not accurately respond to the 
attention check.  
Measures 
  Unless stated otherwise, participants were asked to respond to each of the 
following items on a 1-9 sliding scale, with higher scores indicating an affirmative 
response to the question or statement.  
Anger and hope in reaction to the activist organization. Participants were asked to 
respond to a series of adjectives and statements to assess the emotions they felt when 
thinking about the organization. 
Instructions: In this next set of questions, we would like to ask you about the  
emotions you feel when thinking about this organization, moving the slider below  
anywhere between “Not at all” and “Absolutely”. When thinking about this  
organization, I feel… 
To assess anger in reaction to the organization, participants were asked to respond 
to the following adjectives adapted from prior research assessing anger (e.g., Halperin, 
2011; Mackie et al., 2000): Angry, Irritated, Annoyed, Irate, and Betrayed (α = .97, M = 
3.21, SD = 2.33). 
  To assess hope for the future of relations between Palestinians and Israelis in 
reaction to the organization, participants were asked to respond to two statements adapted 
from prior research (Saguy & Halperin, 2014) following the direction, When thinking 
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about this organization, I feel…: Hopeful about the future relations between Israelis and 
Palestinians and Optimistic that the conflict will end (α = .88, M = 3.81, SD = 2.26). 
An exploratory principal components analysis with oblique rotation using the five 
items to assess anger and the two items to assess hope yielded two distinct factors 
(eigenvalues > 1); this analysis indicated that all five items included to assess anger 
loaded on one factor (loadings .90-.98) and the two items included to assess hope loaded 
on the other factor (.83-.85).  
Support for political solutions. To test effects of condition on support for political 
solutions, participants were asked to indicate their support for two different types of 
peace agreements: a two-state solution (more compromise to the ingroup; M = 2.62, SD = 
2.44), or a one-state solution (less compromise to the ingroup; M = 4.21, SD = 2.74). See 
Appendix for full-text of these measures.  
Glorification of the ingroup. To assess whether the extent to which participants 
glorify their ingroup moderates their reactions to peace activist organizations, participants 
were asked to respond to the scales for glorification and attachment, originally developed 
for use with Jewish Israelis (Roccas et al., 2006).  
Specifically, participants were asked to respond to the eight items assessing 
glorification from Roccas et al. (2006; α = .84, M = 5.78, SD = 1.67), including four 
items designed to assess beliefs in ingroup superiority (e.g., Relative to other nations, we 
are a very moral nation, Israel is better than other nations in all respects), and four items 
designed to assess deference to the ingroup, (e.g., it is disloyal for Israelis to criticize 
Israel, In today’s world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our 
nation). Additionally, to be able to distinguish glorification from feelings of attachment 
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to the ingroup, participants were asked to respond to the eight items from Roccas et al. 
(2006) assessing attachment (e.g., I love Israel; It is important for me to contribute to my 
nation; α = .95, M = 7.19, SD = 1.87). Full versions of the measures are available in 
Appendix.  
Although an exploratory factor analysis with oblique rotation initially yielded four 
factors, analysis of the scree plot indicated that only two were meaningful (the third and 
fourth were at similar points on the y-axis). Thus, a second analysis was conducted 
specifying only two factors, which yielded one factor including the eight items assessing 
glorification (eigenvalue = 7.76; loadings .52-.77) and one factor including the eight 
items assessing attachment (eigenvalue = 2.06; loadings .57-95).   
Study 1 Results 
 Hypotheses were tested using the GLM procedure, separately for each dependent 
variable, entering condition, glorification, and a two-way interaction between 
glorification and condition as predictors. These analyses tested the hypothesis that 
condition and glorification would interact, such that high glorifiers would react most 
negatively to intergroup solidarity, whereas low glorifiers would react most positively to 
intergroup solidarity. Additionally, these analyses controlled for attachment because, 
without controlling for attachment, scores on glorification could reflect national identity 
more broadly, rather than specifically glorification (Roccas et al., 2008) and I sought to 
test for the unique effects of glorification.   
Preliminary analyses using only condition as the independent variable tested 
whether the experimental manipulation significantly affected scores on glorification 
(moderator) or attachment (covariate). The tests revealed that the experimental 
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manipulation of condition did not significantly affect glorification, F(2, 123) = .10, p = 
.902, nor did it affect attachment, F(2, 123) = .73, p = .485.  
Anger and Hope  
 Across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted significantly more 
anger, b = .64, SE = .24, t(113) = 2.67, p = .009, whereas attachment did not predict 
anger, b = -.05, SE = .24, t(119) = -.19, p = .853.  Contrary to hypotheses, neither the 
main effect of condition F(2, 118) = 1.61, p = .204, ηP2 = .027, nor the two-way 
interaction between glorification and condition, F(2, 118) = .04, p = .960, ηP2 = .001, 
significantly predicted anger towards the organization.  
 Across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted less hope, b = -.52, SE 
= .24, t(118) = -2.21, p = .029, whereas higher levels of attachment predicted more hope, 
b = .49, SE = .24, t(118) = 2.07, p = .040.   Yet contrary to hypotheses, neither the two-
way interaction, F(1, 118) = .90, p = .411, ηP2 = .015, nor the main effect of condition, 
F(2, 118) = 1.40, p = .251, ηP2 = .023, predicted hope.  
Support for Political Solutions  
 Analyses also tested the effect of condition, glorification, and the two-way 
interaction between glorification and condition on support for political solutions. The 
solution involving more compromise by the ingroup (e.g., two-state solution) was 
conceptualized as support for the efforts of the activist organization, whereas the solution 
involving less compromise by the ingroup (e.g., one-state solution) was conceptualized as 
backlash. Thus, it was predicted that condition and glorification would interact, such that 
the intergroup solidarity condition would elicit stronger support for a one-state solution 
and lower support for a two-state solution among high glorifiers.  
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 Support for two-state solution (more compromise by the ingroup). As predicted, 
across conditions, higher levels of glorification predicted less support for an outgroup-
favoring solution to the conflict (i.e., two-state solution), b = -1.04, SE = .24, t(119) = -
4.30, p < .001, whereas attachment did not predict support, b = .24, SE = .24, t(119) = 
.99, p = .323. Again, and contrary to hypotheses, neither the main effect of condition, 
F(2, 119) = .69, p = .503, ηP2 = .012, nor the two-way interaction, F(1, 119) = .18, p = 
.836, ηP2 = .003, predicted support for a two-state solution.  
Support for one-state solution (less compromise by the ingroup). Glorification 
predicted significantly more support for a one-state solution, b = .87, SE = .28, t(119) = 
3.10, p = .002, whereas attachment did not predict support, b = -.37, SE = .28, t(119) = -
1.32, p = .191. Neither the main effect of condition, F(2, 119) = .97, p = .384, ηP2 = .016,  
nor the two-way interaction, F(2, 119) = .43, p = .654, ηP2 = .007, predicted support for a 
one-state solution. 
Exploratory Analyses 
 Given that the analyses reported above did not reveal the predicted main or 
interaction effects for group composition on anger, hope, or support for political 
solutions, additional exploratory analyses were conducted. It is conceivable that the 
relatively abstract scenario of imagining a hypothetical organization was not strong 
enough to elicit reactions reflected in the dependent variables. Thus, additional analyses 
tested whether there might be some tentative support for this model in two steps. First, 
within each condition, (partial) correlational analyses tested whether glorification was 
related to each mediator and outcome, controlling for attachment. Second, (bivariate) 
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correlational analyses tested whether anger and hope predicted support for political 
solutions.      
Step 1 of Exploratory Analyses: Do glorification differentially predict outcomes in 
different conditions?  
 Table 1 shows partial correlations between glorification and the mediators and 
outcomes, and between attachment and the mediators and outcomes. Whereas the focus 
of these analyses is on the correlates of glorification independent of attachment, 
relationships with attachment are also presented to show that these dimensions of 
identification function differently. As Table 1 shows, among participants in the 
intergroup solidarity condition, glorification predicted marginally higher levels of anger. 
Glorification did not significantly predict hope. Glorification predicted less support for a 
two-state solution, and more support for a one-state solution. Among participants in the 
ingroup only condition, glorification predicted neither anger or hope. Higher levels of 
glorification marginally predicted less support for a two-state solution, and showed a 
trend toward predicting support for a two-state solution. As shown in the bottom of Table 
1, among participants in the outgroup only condition, glorification predicted marginally 
more anger and significantly less hope. Glorification predicted less support for a two-
state solution and a trend toward more support for a one-state solution.  
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Table 1. Study 1 Partial correlations of glorification and attachment with mediators and 
outcomes in each experimental condition.    
 Anger Hope Support for 
two-
state 
solution 
Support for 
one-
state 
solution 
Intergroup Condition     
Glorification partial r 
                                    p 
.27 
.073 
-.05 
.730 
-.31 
.040 
.40 
.007 
Attachment partial     r         -.01                .18      -.09                  -.20             
    
            p          .971              .250               .570                  .203         
Ingroup Condition     
Glorification partial r 
                                   
p 
.15 
 .342 
-.17 
.257 
-.27 
.077 
 .22 
.150 
Attachment partial r 
                                  p 
.013 
.936 
.13 
.399 
.13 
.399 
-.09 
.552 
 
Outgroup Condition     
Glorification partial r 
                                    
p 
   .32 
 .069 
-.42 
 .014 
-.60 
<.001 
.19 
.286 
Attachment partial r 
                                   
p 
     -.07 
    .693 
 .32 
.067 
 .32 
.070 
-.06 
.748 
 
Partial correlations (glorification controlling for attachment, attachment controlling for 
glorification) are presented in the first row, with p values in the second row.  
 
Step 2 of exploratory analyses: Do hypothesized mediators predict the outcomes? 
 Although the group composition condition did not significantly predict either the 
mediators or outcomes, links between the hypothesized mediators (anger and hope) and 
dependent variables (support for political solutions) were tested on an exploratory basis 
through bivariate correlations. In line with predictions, anger was associated with less 
support for a two-state solution, r = -.33, p < .001, and more support for a one-state 
solution, r = .23, p = .011. In contrast, hope was associated with more support for a two-
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state solution, r = .47, p < .001, and it did not significantly correlate with support for a 
one-state solution, r = -.07, p = .448. 
Study 1 Discussion 
 Study 1 examined whether glorification would predict hope and anger towards 
peace activism, as well as support for political solutions reflecting compromise, 
depending upon whether the peace activist organizations included both ingroup members 
and outgroup members working together in solidarity, or only ingroup members or 
outgroup members. It was predicted that glorification would positively predict anger and 
support for a political solution that involved the least compromise to the ingroup, and 
negatively predict hope and support for a political solution reflecting more compromise, 
and that these relationships would be strongest in reference to activist organizations of 
both groups working together.  Contrary to predictions, analyses did not show that the 
manipulation of group composition, nor the interaction between condition and 
glorification predicted anger, hope, or support for political solutions to the conflict.  It is 
possible that these null effects for condition may have been due to the abstract nature of 
the task: imagining a hypothetical peace activist organization with ingroup members and 
outgroup members working together, or just ingroup members or outgroup members, 
may not have been concrete enough to yield significant effects on emotions or political 
solutions to an ongoing conflict.  
The clearest result from Study 1 is that higher scores on glorification predicted 
outcomes reflecting backlash: more anger, less hope, less support for a political solution 
reflecting political compromise, and more support for a political solution suggesting less 
compromise by the ingroup.  Additionally, exploratory analyses indicated some support 
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for the notion that glorification would predict greater anger in reaction to intergroup 
solidarity, but not in reaction to activists solely from the ingroup.  As such, these 
supplementary analyses are consistent with the hypothesis that those who strongly glorify 
their ingroup will be especially likely to react negatively to intergroup solidarity.  
Together, these findings suggest that activism representing both groups working together 
(intergroup solidarity) may be more likely to provoke negative responses among those 
who strongly glorify the ingroup, whereas glorification may play less of a role in how 
people feel towards activist organizations that include only ingroup members.   
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2 
Study 2 Introduction 
Given concerns that the experimental manipulation in Study 1 was too abstract, 
Study 2 was designed using a more concrete manipulation of group composition. Study 2 
used a student sample to contextualize the activist organization around a campus setting, 
framing the organization as a campus student group. The primary goal of Study 2 was to 
test how the group composition of the activist organization impacted support for its 
efforts, while examining anger and hope as mediators for these effects. I had predicted 
that an intergroup activist organization would elicit more anger and less hope than an 
ingroup activist organization, and by doing so, less support for the organization and its 
activities on campus.  
In contrast to measures of support for political solutions, these outcomes are 
directly tied to participants’ support for the organization itself, and are not confounded 
with strongly held prior beliefs regarding the conflict or political solutions to the conflict. 
Political attitudes about the conflict are hard to change (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011).  Even 
if people are open to activism to resolve the conflict and are even inclined to support their 
ingroup making significant compromises for peace, they still likely disagree on what the 
most sustainable permanent solution to the conflict is.  By adjusting outcome measures 
from Study 1 to be in direct connection to the activist organization, the measure of hope 
in Study 2 reflected hope regarding the activities of the organization, rather than 
appraisals of hope for future relations (e.g., as in Saguy & Halperin, 2014). The survey 
still measured support for specific political solutions as in Study 1, but the focus of 
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outcomes switched to support for the organizations to speak on campus and agreement 
with a critique of the organizations, to more directly connect participants’ responses to 
their support for activism. Additionally, Study 2 included a measure of support for 
negotiations with Palestinians, to examine whether participants’ inclinations towards 
negotiating might shift as a result of the experimental manipulation.   
Study 2 Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Seventy-two participants were recruited for the study from a private university in 
Israel. Data from 11 participants were excluded either for not indicating whether they 
were an Israeli citizen or indicating that they were not an Israeli citizen. Data from 
another four participants were excluded for indicating a religion other than Judaism, and 
data from another two participants were excluded because they indicated participating in 
peace demonstrations more than “seldom”.  
Participants were recruited via the School of Psychology’s experimental 
participation system in return for course credit. The online advertisement informed 
participants that the study was about “Learning about political organizations”. Upon 
consenting to the study, participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. 
Participants were told about a specific (fictitious) campus organization that either 
included Jewish Israelis and Palestinians working together (namely, Israelis and 
Palestinians Working for a Solution; intergroup solidarity condition), or only Jewish 
Israelis (namely, Israelis Working for a Solution; ingroup condition). In both conditions, 
participants read that the organization aimed to promote a non-violent political solution to 
the conflict to which both Israelis and Palestinians could agree. Also in both conditions, 
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participants read that the organization was recently critiqued as “dangerous for its naïve 
perceptions and misguided agenda.” This information was included to allow for a range 
of participant responses to be deemed acceptable (e.g., from support to rejection of 
activism) and to set the context for a dependent variable assessing participants’ 
agreement with criticism of the organization. The full English version of the text is 
presented below: 
The organization, (Israelis Working for a Solution/Israelis and 
Palestinians Working for a Solution) is a (Jewish-Israeli/joint Jewish 
Israeli and Palestinian) non-profit composed completely of (Jewish-
Israeli/Jewish-Israeli and Palestinian) volunteers. The organization was 
founded in 1995 with the goal of promoting public support for a non-
violent political solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that will be 
acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians. The organization often 
holds rallies in support of political negotiations and in opposition to 
policies and actions they see as exacerbating the conflict, including on 
university campuses. This past week, the organization was harshly 
criticized in an op-ed as “dangerous for its naïve perceptions and 
misguided agenda.”  
   
Following the manipulation, all participants were presented with a scenario in 
which a student wing of the organization indicated that it would like to speak at the 
university.  Specifically, participants read that the organization has a student wing at their 
university that wishes to invite students and faculty to learn about the organization and its 
goals, and that the university will decide whether to schedule this event based upon 
students’ support or opposition. The English version of the text is below.  
[Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis 
Working for a Solution] has a student wing at the (name of school). 
They want to invite students and faculty to hear about the 
organization and its goals at the Social Services Center.  
  
The center will decide whether to schedule this or not based on students’ 
support or opposition. 
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How much would you support scheduling this organization to present at 
the Social Services Center?  
 
An attention check administered at the end of the study indicated that many 
participants did not correctly indicate the group composition of the organization they read 
about.  Seven participants did not correctly indicate the group composition in the 
intergroup condition (with five indicating that no specific organization was specified, one 
not answering the question, and one indicating that only Jewish Israelis were in the 
organization) and ten participants did not correctly indicate the group composition in the 
ingroup condition.  Within each condition, analyses using the GLM procedure were 
conducted to test whether participants’ scores on outcome measures varied significantly 
depending on whether they did or did not pass the attention check.  No significant 
differences and only two marginal effects were observed (see Table 2).  Thus, the 
attention check was regarded as a general check of participants’ retention of the 
information regarding group composition, rather than as a criterion for exclusion; notes 
have been added to specify when different results emerge when those who did not 
accurately respond to the manipulation check are excluded.  Altogether, a total of 55 
participants, 28 in the intergroup solidarity condition and 27 in the ingroup condition 
(ages 19-35, M = 23.04, SD = 2.28; 16 men and 39 women) were included in data 
analysis.1 
                                                     
1 Initially, the design for this study included two additional conditions: a ‘baseline’ condition where no 
specific organization was specified, and an ‘outgroup only’ condition that included only outgroup 
members.  In hindsight, both of these conditions were likely confusing to participants and were therefore 
dropped from the study design. 
First, although the baseline condition did not mention a specific organization in the manipulation, the 
scenario describing a student wing of “one of these organizations” on campus implied an actual 
organization; thus, participants were left to guess the group composition of that organization. Second, 
although the college has Palestinian students who are citizens of Israel, they make up a very small 
proportion of the total student body, thereby reducing the believability of this manipulation. 
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Table 2. Differences between participants who passed vs. did not pass attention check in 
Study 2. 
     Passed 
Attention 
Check 
M (SD) 
Did not 
pass 
attention 
check 
M (SD) 
t 
Intergroup 
condition 
Anger towards the 
organization 
2.84 (1.66) 1.92 
(.82) 
t(24) 1.20, p = .242 
 Hope towards the 
organization 
5.04 (2.30) 5.78 
(2.98) 
t(24) = -.62, p = 
.543 
 Support for the 
organization to 
present on campus 
5.87 (1.53) 6.36 
(.76) 
t(24) = -.62, p = 
.543. 
 Agreement with 
critique of the 
organization 
4.56 (1.64) 4.50 
(2.08) 
t(21) = .06, p = 
.950 
 Support for 
negotiations with 
Palestinians 
5.86 (1.90) 6.19 
(3.57) 
t(22) = -.27, p = 
.789 
 Support for a one-
state solution with 
Palestinian enclaves 
3.81 
(1.90) 
2.37 
(2.73) 
t(20) = 1.39, p = 
.178 
 Support for a one-
state solution 
expelling Arabs  
6.71 (5.83) 6.67 
(3.05) 
t(24) = .03, p = 
.975 
 Support for a two-
state solution 
3.61 (1.91) 2.68 
(3.02) 
t(23) = .87, p = 
.395 
Ingroup 
condition 
Anger towards the 
organization 
3.69 (2.38) 3.87  
(1.86) 
t(25) = -.21, p = 
.837  
 Hope towards the 
organization 
3.53 (1.88) 3.62 
(1.32) 
t(24) = -.14, p = 
.889 
 Support for the 
organization to 
present on campus 
4.64 (2.28) 4.89 
(1.82) 
t(24) = -.29, p = 
.773 
 Agreement with 
critique of the 
organization 
5.90 (2.20) 4.54 
(1.48) 
t(23) = 1.71, p = 
.1008 
 Support for 
negotiations with 
Palestinians 
5.12 (2.30) 4.98 
(1.80) 
t(24) = .17, p = 
.870 
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 Support for a one-
state solution with 
Palestinian enclaves 
3.46 
(2.34) 
4.02 
(2.07) 
t(24) = -.62, p = 
.542 
 Support for a one-
state solution 
expelling Arabs  
5.95 (2.90) 6.13 
(2.51) 
t(24) = -.17, p = 
.869 
 Support for a two-
state solution 
3.92 (2.69) 2.29 
(1.37) 
t(24) = 1.77, p = 
.089 
 
 
Measures 
Following the manipulation and presentation of the scenario with the student wing 
requesting to speak on campus, three sets of measures were used to assess outcomes, 
concerning participants’ emotional responses of anger and hope, support for the 
organization, and policy support. Unless otherwise specified, all scales in the survey 
ranged from 1 (“Strongly oppose” or “Strongly disagree”) to 9 (“Strongly support” or 
“Strongly oppose), with two decimal places in between.  
Glorification (M = 5.03, SD = 1.18, α = .88) and attachment (M = 5.74, SD = 
1.22, α = .88). Glorification and attachment were assessed through pre-screening 
measures taken at the beginning of the semester, using shortened four-item versions of 
the scales used in Study 1, scored on a scale ranging from 1 (Strongly Disagree) to 7 
(Strongly Agree). In an oblique rotation specifying two factors, the items for attachment 
(loadings .62-.97, eigenvalue = 4.32) formed a separate scale from the items for 
glorification (loadings .71-.86, eigenvalue = .97).  
Anger and hope. To assess differences in anger and hope in response to the 
organization, participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt 12 different 
emotions in randomized order, which were scored on a scale ranging from “Not at all” (1) 
and “Absolutely” (9).  Anger (M = 3.22, SD = 1.96, α = .96) was measured with the same 
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emotion items as in Study 1.  The measure of hope (M = 4.37, SD = 2.20) was changed 
from Study 1 and measured with the single item hopeful. in order to better reflect an 
emotional state rather than more general views of the conflict.2 
Support for the student organization.  Two measures assessed participants’ 
support for the student wing of the organization, to provide a more concrete basis for 
participants’ responses.  Single-item measures asked participants how much they 
supported having the organization speak on campus and how much they agreed with the 
critique of the organization. First, participants were asked to indicate their support or 
opposition to the student wing of the organization presenting on campus (M = 5.31, SD = 
1.89), on a scale ranging from “Strongly oppose” (1) and “Strongly Support” (9).  
Second, participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the critique of the 
organization as “dangerous for its naïve perceptions and misguided agenda” (M = 4.97, 
SD = 1.89), on a scoring scale ranging from 1 (“Strongly disagree”) to 9 (“Strongly 
agree”).  
 Support for political solutions.  As in Study 1, Study 2 included measures 
assessing support for a one-state solution with Palestinian enclaves (M = 3.60, SD = 
2.15), and support for a two-state solution (M = 3.36, SD = 2.24). In addition, Study 2 
included a more general measure of support for negotiations with Palestinians (M = 5.47, 
SD = 2.14). For the negotiations measure, participants indicated on a 9-point scale the 
extent to which they would describe themselves as a “Hawk” vs. “Dove” regarding 
support for negotiations between the Israeli government and Palestinians, with lower 
scores indicating more hawkishness and resistance to negotiations, and higher scores 
                                                     
2 One additional item intended to assess hope, despair (reverse-scored) was excluded from analyses 
because it did not correlate strongly with the ‘hopeful’ item.” 
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indicating more dovishness and support for negotiations. Although attitudes towards the 
conflict are hard to change (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011), situational factors can affect 
support for negotiations (Kteily, Saguy, Sidanius, & Taylor, 2013). This general measure 
of support for negotiations was added because it indicates openness to improving future 
relations, whereas support for specific political solutions might have more to do with 
participants’ prior political opinions, or their views about what may be realistic or 
sustainable.   
Study 2 Results 
 Analyses using the GLM procedure and controlling for attachment, tested how 
condition, glorification, and the interaction between condition and glorification predicted 
all mediators and outcomes.3   
Anger and Hope 
 Participants in the intergroup solidarity condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.56) reported 
significantly lower anger relative to those in the ingroup condition (M = 3.76, SD = 2.17), 
F(1, 49) = 4.82, p = .033, ηP2 = .091. Glorification predicted significantly higher levels of 
anger, b = .76, SE = .29, t(48) = 2.64, p = .011, whereas attachment did not predict anger, 
b = .23, SE = .30, t(48) = .77, p = .448. The interaction between condition and 
glorification was not significant, F(1, 48) = .07, .794, ηP2 = .001.         
                                                     
3Since the sample was heavily female, and one condition had a disproportionately high number of females 
relative to the other condition, logistic regression tested whether this imbalance was statistically significant. 
Analyses indicated that there were significantly fewer males in the intergroup solidarity condition (2) than 
in the ingroup condition (10), b = 1.59, SE = .66, Wald Chi-Square = 5.57, p = .018. Thus, to limit the 
extent to which gender presented a confound analyzing differences between conditions, an initial set of 
analyses was conducted with gender as a covariate in all analyses, as well as the interaction between 
condition and gender (see Yzerbyt, Muller, & Judd, 2003). Since neither gender nor the interaction between 
gender and condition explained significant variance in any outcome (with the exception of two marginal 
interactions predicting support for negotiations and interest in joining the organization, p ≥ .09), gender and 
the interaction between gender and condition were not included as predictors in the main analyses.  
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At the same time, participants in the intergroup solidarity condition (M = 5.18, SD 
= 2.40) reported significantly greater hope relative to those in the ingroup condition (M = 
3.56, SD = 1.66), F(1, 48) = 8.81, p = .005, ηp2 = .158. Neither glorification, b = .47, SE = 
.35, t(48) = 1.34, p = .186 nor attachment significantly predicted hope, b = -.41, SE = .36, 
t(48) = -1.13, p = .265. Additionally, the interaction between condition and glorification 
was not significant, F(1, 48) = .50, p = .483, ηp2 = .011.  
Support for the Organization 
 Contrary to expectations, participants in the intergroup condition (M = 5.93, SD = 
1.45) showed greater support for the organization to speak on campus relative to 
participants in the ingroup condition (M = 4.73, SD = 2. 08), F(1, 45) = 5.00, p = .030, ηp2 
= .100. Neither glorification, b = -.56, SE = .35, t(45) =-1.60, p = .116, nor attachment b = 
-.17, SE = .35, t(48) = -.47, p = .642, significantly predicted support. The interaction 
between condition and glorification was not significant, F(1, 45) = .08, p = .777, ηp2 = 
.002.  Additionally, there was a non-significant trend for participants in the intergroup 
condition (M = 4.55, SD = 1.67) to report less agreement with the critique relative to 
those the ingroup condition (M = 5.36, SD = 2.03), F(1, 43) =2.16, p = .149, ηp2  = .048; 
no other main or interaction effects were significant.  
Support for Political Solutions 
 There was a trend for those in the intergroup solidarity condition (M = 5.91, SD = 
2.16) to express more identification as a “dove”, supporting negotiations with 
Palestinians, relative to the ingroup condition (M = 5.06, SD = 2.08), F(1, 46) = 2.11, p = 
.153, ηp2 = .045. Glorification did not significantly predict identification as a “dove”, b = 
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-.12, SE = .36, t(48) = -.33, p = .742, nor did the interaction between glorification and 
condition, F(4, 45) = 1.91, p = .173, ηp2 = .041.  
 The experimental manipulation did not significantly affect participants’ support 
for any of the political solutions. Neither condition, F(4, 46) = .06, p = .805, ηp2 = .001, 
nor glorification, b = -.03, SE = .38, t(46) = -.08, p = .934, nor the interaction between 
condition and glorification, F(4, 46) = .00, p = ..978, ηp2 = .00 significantly predicted 
support for a one-state solution. Similarly, neither condition, F(4, 46) = .06, p = .813, ηp2 
= .001, nor glorification, b = .11, SE = .40, t(48) = .27, p = .789, nor the interaction 
between condition and glorification, F(4, 46) = .14, p = ..712, ηp2 = .003, significantly 
predicted support for a two-state solution.  
Mediation Analyses 
 Analyses of the condition effects above suggested that participants in Study 2 
reacted somewhat more receptively to an intergroup rather than ingroup-only activist 
organization in the university context; they reported feeling less anger, more hope , and  
were more supportive of allowing it to speak on campus. Mediation analyses tested 
whether the intergroup condition, as contrasted to the ingroup condition, affected support 
for the organization speaking on campus indirectly via its effects on anger and hope. All 
analyses controlled for glorification, attachment, and the interaction between glorification 
and condition. I used Hayes’ Process (2013) Model 4 with 5,000 bootstrapping samples 
for each analysis, using a dummy variable representing the condition (with a value of ‘0’ 
for those in the ingroup condition and a value of ‘1’ for those in the intergroup 
condition).   
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Predicting support for the organization speaking on campus. The intergroup 
condition increased support for allowing the organization on campus indirectly via 
(reduction in) anger and (increase in) hope as mediators was significant, b = .39, boot SE 
= .26, [LLCI: .0454, ULCI: 1.1299], and b = .40, boot SE = .25, [LLCI: .10688, ULCI: 
1.0787], respectively. The total effect was significant, b = .79, boot SE = .34, [LLCI: 
.2480, ULCI: 1.6006]. The direct effect was not significant once the mediators were 
taken into account, b = .19, boot SE = .46, p = .41, p = .687.  
Exploratory Analyses 
As in Study 1, additional exploratory analyses tested whether glorification 
(controlling for attachment) would correlate with the mediators and outcomes 
differentially when participants in the intergroup condition and the ingroup condition are 
treated as separate samples. Table 4 presents partial correlations between glorifications 
(partialling out attachment) and mediators and outcomes, and between attachment 
(partialling out glorification) and mediators and outcomes. Although correlates of 
glorification are the focus of analyses, correlates of attachment are reported to show how 
glorification is related to mediators and outcomes differently from attachment. As Table 
3 shows, among participants in the intergroup condition, glorification significantly 
predicted more anger and less support for having the organization present at the 
university, and marginally less support for a two-state solution (which would involve 
compromise by the ingroup).  There was also a trend for glorification to predict stronger 
agreement with the criticism of the organization. In contrast, among participants in the 
ingroup condition, glorification was not significantly related to any of the mediators or 
outcomes.  
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Table 3.  Study 2 Partial correlations of glorification with mediators and outcomes in each 
experimental condition.    
 Anger Hope Presenting Criticism Negotiations Two-state         One-state 
Intergroup Condition       
Glorification  partial r  
                                  p             
                         
.58 
.010 
-.11 
.663 
-.60 
.007 
.38 
.104 
    -.37 
    .121 
-.43                    -.18 
.067                     .454 
Attachment partial      r 
                                   p 
-.29 
.235 
.16 
.523 
.48 
.037 
-.14 
.562 
     .28 
   .249 
.46                     -.05 
.047                   .853 
 
Ingroup Condition      
Glorification partial r  
                                 p             
  .34            .07    
 .118         .749 
   -.22 
  .321 
 
-.05 
.827 
-.27                  .06                          
.224                 .798 
     -.09 
           .706 
Attachment partial  r                             
                               p 
.18 -.47              
.423         .026 
-.23 
.296 
 .32 
.153 
-.22                 -.53 
.325                .012 
            .01 
           .975 
Partial correlations (glorification controlling for attachment, attachment controlling for 
glorification) are presented in the first row, with p values in the second row.  
 
 Also as in Study 1, bivariate correlations examined relations between the 
mediators (anger and hope) and outcomes. As shown in Table 4, anger was significantly 
associated with less support for having the organization present at the university, more 
agreement with criticism of the organization, and less support for negotiations with 
Palestinians (i.e., identification as ‘dove’). In contrast, hope positively predicted more 
support for having the organization present at the university, more support for 
negotiations with Palestinians, and more support for a two-state solution.  
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Table 4. Study 2 Bivariate correlations of anger and hope with outcomes across 
conditions.    
 Support 
for 
presenting 
Criticism Negotiations Two-
state 
One-
state 
 
Anger bivariate  r 
                           p                         
-.56 
<.001
.45 
.001 
-.41 
.003 
-.15 
.308 
.21 
.135 
 
Hope bivariate r 
                          p                          
.47 
<.001
-.22 
.142 
.41 
.003 
 .34 
 .015 
-.21 
.142 
  
 
Study 2 Discussion 
 Study 2 tested how an activist organization composed of ingroup members and 
outgroup members working together, as compared to an activist organization composed 
of only ingroup members, would predict emotions, support for the organization, and 
support for political solutions, and whether glorification with the ingroup might moderate 
the effects.  In Study 2, participants were most receptive towards the intergroup, rather 
than the ingroup-only, activist organization. The effects of the intergroup condition on 
support for allowing the organization to present on campus was explained via decrease in 
anger and an increase in hope. 
 Although there were not significant interaction effects involving glorification, 
supplemental exploratory analyses indicated that glorification was positively related to 
anger, and negatively related to outcomes reflecting support for the organization among 
participants in the intergroup condition.  These tentative findings converge with those 
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obtained in Study 1, suggesting that higher levels of glorification may lead people to 
respond with backlash rather than support to activist organizations representing 
intergroup solidarity.  A limitation of this study is that such effects for glorification were 
not observed in the GLM analyses testing its interaction with condition; this may have 
been due to the low power of the sample, which could not be controlled given challenges 
in recruiting students in the private university setting. For this reason, Study 3 again used 
a survey company to collect participants from a national sample.   
  Together, findings from the first two studies suggest that representations of 
intergroup solidarity may build support for peace activist organizations (Study 2), yet 
(tentatively) higher levels of glorification may instead lead to backlash against activist 
organizations that enact intergroup solidarity (Studies 1 and 2). Although I encountered 
challenges in recruiting undergraduate participants from a private Israeli university in 
Study 2, findings from Study 2 are nonetheless informative, in that they show that the 
group composition of activist organizations can affect Jewish Israelis’ responses to their 
efforts, while underlining the importance of testing their effects as moderated by 
glorification.   
 This main effect of condition in Study 2 was not expected, whereby the intergroup 
organization decreased anger, and increased hope and support for allowing the 
organization to present on campus. Rather than presuming that intergroup solidarity itself 
led to this main effect, a second factor may have played a role in relation to both 
intergroup solidarity and glorification.  As noted earlier in this dissertation, people who 
score high in glorification are especially likely to be sensitive to activism in the form of 
intergroup solidarity, because this solidarity may threaten their views of the ingroup as 
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superior and suggest that the ingroup may need to address its own immoral behavior 
(Roccas et al., 2006; Roccas et al., 2008).  Implicit in this analysis is the possibility that 
people high in glorification are sensitive to criticism of the ingroup.  Whereas past 
research has shown that those who strongly glorify the ingroup are sensitive to 
information that threatens the moral image of their ingroup (Leidner et al., 2010), it has 
not been directly tested how they may be sensitive to direct criticism of the ingroup.  
 Studies 1-2 did not directly manipulate whether the activist organizations were 
critical of the ingroup, yet it is possible that perceived criticism of the ingroup may have 
influenced participants’ responses. In particular, Israeli activists advocating for change in 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are advocating either directly for changes to their 
government’s policies or for more awareness regarding the consequences of those 
policies (see Naise et al., 2014; Perry, 2011). It would have been plausible for 
participants to presume that the intergroup organization would have been critical of both 
groups. Indeed, at least one of the most prominent activist organizations in this context 
that include Israelis and Palestinians working together is critical of violence on either side 
(e.g., Combatants for Peace; see Perry, 2011); in contrast, an Israeli-only activist 
organization tends to center its critique on its own ingroup (e.g., Breaking the Silence). In 
a context of intergroup conflict, learning about a member of the outgroup criticizing their 
own group can increase hope about the conflict ending and, in so doing, openness to 
hearing their perspective (Saguy & Halperin, 2014).  
 Although people are generally less sensitive to members of their ingroup who 
critique the ingroup than to members of the outgroup who do so (e.g., Hornsey et al., 
2002), in contexts of intergroup conflict, the extra allowance for ingroup members to 
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criticize the ingroup disappears (Ariyanto et al., 2012). If the intergroup condition elicited 
support with the presumption that this intergroup organization was critical of both 
groups, it would add to past research on forms of indirect exposure and group-based 
criticism (Ariyanto et al., 2012; Saguy & Halperin, 2014), by showing that outgroup 
members joining with ingroup members to criticize both together may buffer the negative 
impact of the ingroup receiving criticism.  
Presuming that the intergroup organization was critical of just the ingroup could 
also have divergent consequences. If participants did not presume that the intergroup 
organization was critical of both groups, and presumed instead that it was critical of just 
the ingroup, the intergroup organization may have elicited backlash; not only would 
ingroup members be criticizing the ingroup, but they would be joining members of the 
outgroup to do it. If support for the intergroup activist organization is indeed due to 
participants’ presumption that the intergroup organization is critical of both groups, this 
would help explain why some effects observed in the previous studies (e.g., agreement 
with the critique, support for negotiations) were less clear and only emerged as trends.   
Manipulating both the group composition of the activist organization and the 
target of its criticism allows for a more direct test of how intergroup solidarity may 
induce support for or backlash to peace activism depending upon who is (are) perceived 
to be the target(s) of criticism, and how glorification moderates these effects. Put another 
way, the way in which glorification predicts support for activist organizations may 
depend both on the group composition and the target of criticism.  Study 3 was designed 
to test these possibilities. 
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CHAPTER 4  
STUDY 3 
Study 3 Introduction 
Study 3 was designed to build on the findings of Study 2 by directly testing how 
group composition of the activist organization (both ingroup members and outgroup 
members vs. ingroup members only) leads to support or backlash for the organization 
depending upon the perceived target of its criticism (both ingroup and outgroup, or 
ingroup only), and whether or how glorification further moderates these effects (three-
way interaction).  I expected that the intergroup composition should elicit higher levels of 
support when the activist organization is critical of both groups, and that it should elicit 
the most backlash when it is critical of only the ingroup. Moreover, I expected that 
glorification should generally predict more backlash toward the activist organization, and 
particularly when both groups are working together in solidarity and when only the 
ingroup is the target of criticism.  
Additionally, Study 3, like Study 1, employed a national sample. Using a national 
sample enabled more participants to be recruited, to ensure that there would be acceptable 
statistical power for testing hypotheses. In particular, the larger sample allowed for 
testing whether participants’ glorification of Israel would moderate how either the group 
composition or target of criticism, or interaction between the two conditions (e.g., three-
way interaction) would affect emotions and support for activism and political solutions, 
and whether the hypothesized indirect effects of the interacting conditions (via anger and 
hope) depended open glorification (e.g., moderated mediation with two moderators of the 
indirect effect). I expected that those who strongly glorify the ingroup should be 
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particularly sensitive to criticism when the ingroup is the only target of criticism, and 
should also react negatively to instances of intergroup solidarity, whereby the ingroup is 
working with the outgroup. In contrast, low glorifiers should be relatively less sensitive 
to having the ingroup be the only target of criticism, and may respond more positively to 
instances of intergroup solidarity when the ingroup and outgroup are working together. 
However, both low and high glorifiers still would likely react aversely to both groups 
working together when the target of their criticism remains exclusively the ingroup.  
Study 3 Method 
Participants and Procedure  
Based on a power analysis4  for a two-factor study examining fixed effects and 
interactions and expecting medium effect sizes, 301 Jewish Israeli participants were 
recruited to participate in Study 3 via the online company Midgam 
(https://www.midgampanel.com). Participants were randomly assigned to one of four 
conditions reading about activist organizations, differing according to two factors: the 
group composition and target of criticism. Each factor had two levels within a 2 (group 
composition: intergroup solidarity vs. ingroup only) x 2 (target of criticism: both ingroup 
and outgroup members vs. only ingroup members) factorial design.  
Upon consenting to the study, participants were presented with one of four texts 
that varied along two factors: (1) whether it described an organization called “Israelis and 
Palestinians Working for a Solution” (intergroup solidarity condition) or whether it 
described an organization called “Israelis Working for a Solution” (ingroup only 
                                                     
4 The program GPower (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) was used to conduct the power analysis 
with an ANOVA with four groups, main effects, and an interaction, expecting slightly smaller than medium 
effect sizes. 
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condition); and (2) whether the organization was reported to be critical of “Israeli and 
Palestinian policies and actions they see as exacerbating the conflict” (criticism towards 
both ingroup and outgroup) or of “Israeli policies and actions they see as exacerbating the 
conflict” (e.g., criticism towards the ingroup only). These procedures allowed group 
composition to be manipulated in the same way as was done for Study 2, while also 
adding the factor of target of criticism. Moreover, like Study 2, across conditions the text 
in Study 3 read “The organization was founded in 1995 with the goal of stopping such 
policies and actions, and promoting public support for a non-violent political solution to 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that will be acceptable to both Israelis and Palestinians. 
They hold rallies to oppose these policies and actions, and to support political 
negotiations.” 
Rather than presenting an organization with a student wing on campus as in Study 
2, Study 3 presented participants with an organization intending to organize events in 
areas of Israel near the participants; participants were further informed that local 
governments will use the survey as a poll of public opinion showing support or 
opposition to the organization using public spaces for this purpose. The English version 
of the text of this scenario is provided below.  
[Israelis and Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis Working 
for a Solution] wants to organize events to discuss the conflict and 
potential solutions at public venues across all of Israel, including public 
libraries, universities, and parks.  
 
Local governments are deciding whether to allow [Israelis and 
Palestinians Working for a Solution – or – Israelis Working for a 
Solution] to organize for this purpose. Since a representative sample of 
Israel’s population is taking this survey, local governments are using the 
opinions of Israelis in each locality taking this survey to decide whether to 
allow the organization to present in public venues.  
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Of the participants recruited for this study, one participant was excluded based on 
their identification as Christian, and another eight were excluded because they indicated 
that they had participated in demonstrations to promote peace between Israelis and 
Palestinians more than “seldom”. In an effort to omit careless responses that are common 
in online data collection (see Curran, 2016)  another 60 participants were excluded for 
failing an attention check at the end of the study asking about the group composition of 
the activist organization.  These included 20 participants in the intergroup condition (5 
where both groups were targets of criticism, 15 where only the ingroup was the target of 
criticism) and 40 participants in the ingroup only condition (18 where both groups were 
targets of criticism and 22 where only the ingroup was the target of criticism), leaving a 
total of 232 participants for data analysis (109 men and 123 women; ages 18-64, M = 
39.28 years, SD = 13.18).5  
 As in Studies 1-2, the attention check was located at the end of the study. 
Although I had considered moving the attention check earlier, soon after the experimental 
manipulations, I decided to keep it at the end of the survey out of concern that asking 
specific questions about group composition directly after the manipulation would prompt 
participants’ suspicions regarding the study’s purpose. However, in addition to the 
multiple-choice attention checks, a continuous measure of participants’ perceptions of 
                                                     
5 There were no significant differences across any of the conditions between those excluded and not 
excluded for the group composition attention check on the outcomes of anger, hope, support for the 
organization presenting, or agreement with the critique in any condition.  Within the condition with both 
groups criticizing both groups, there was a trend for those excluded to be less supportive of a one-state 
solution, p = .164.  Within the condition where the ingroup criticizes both groups, there was a trend for 
participants who were excluded to be less agreeing with the critique, p = .189, and less supportive of a one-
state solution, p = .129. Also within the condition where the ingroup criticizes the ingroup, those who were 
excluded were significantly more supportive of a two-state solution, p = .038, and there was a trend for 
those excluded to be more supportive of a one-state solution. Within the condition where only the ingroup 
criticizes the ingroup, those who were excluded were significantly more supportive of a two-state solution, 
p = .038.  
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who the organization was critical of (Israel and Israeli policies and groups or Palestinians 
and Palestinian groups) was included directly following the manipulation, and used as a 
check of whether the manipulation affected perceived target of criticism successfully.  
Criticism of the ingroup and outgroup. An exploratory principal components 
analysis with oblique rotation showed that seven items involving ingroup criticism (e.g., 
criticizing the policies and actions of Israel, criticizing the Israeli government, criticizing 
the terror perpetrated by Israelis; loadings .67-.94) formed a distinct factor from four 
items revolving around outgroup criticism (e.g., criticizing the policies and actions of 
Palestinians, criticizing the Palestinian organizations who use violence against Israel, 
criticizing terrorism committed by Palestinians; loadings .61-.94).  Both the 7-item 
measure of ingroup criticism (M = 6.79, SD = 1.68, α = .92) and the 4-item measure of 
outgroup criticism (M = 3.76, SD = 2.04, α = .88) formed reliable scales.   
Results of check for perceived criticism. To check whether the manipulation for 
target of criticism was effective, a GLM tested main effects of group composition and 
target of criticism on the two measures assessing participants’ perceptions of Israel as the 
target of criticism and of Palestinians as the target of criticism. As expected, framing both 
groups (M = 4.27, SD = 2.05) rather than just the ingroup (M = 3.24, 1.90) as the target of 
criticism significantly increased the perception that the organization is critical of 
Palestinians, F(2, 229) = 15.76, p < .001, ηp2 = .064. Framing the organization as critical 
of both groups (M = 6.46, SD = 1.59) rather than just the ingroup (M = 7.15, SD = 1.61) 
also reduced the extent to which participants perceived the organization as critical of 
Israel, F(2, 229) = 10.25, p = .002, ηp2 = .043. Surprisingly, both groups working together 
(M = 6.96, SD = 1.59) rather than just the ingroup working alone (M = 6.56, SD = 1.79) 
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marginally increased the perception that the organization is critical of Israel, F(2, 229) = 
3.12, p = .067, ηp2 = .015; both groups working together (M = 3.57, SD = 2.01), rather 
than just the ingroup working alone (M = 4.04, SD = 2.06) marginally decreased the 
perception that the organization is critical of Palestinians, F(2, 229) =  3.12, p = .079, ηp2 
= .013. 
Measures 
Study 3 included the same measures used in Study 2 to assess anger (M = 5.35, 
SD = 2.36, α = .95), hope (M = 3.33, SD = 2.48), support for having the organization 
present (M = 3.95, SD = 2.61), and agreement with the critique of the organization (M = 
6.28, SD = 2.31).  Study 3 also included the same measures as Study 2 to assess support 
for political solutions, including support for a one-state solution with Palestinian enclaves 
(M = 4.13, SD = 2.42) and support for a two-state solution (M = 2.72, SD = 2.29), and 
support for negotiations with Palestinians (M = 4.67, SD = 2.33).  
Glorification (M = 5.76, SD = 1.64, α = .84) and attachment (M = 7.44, SD = 
1.51, α = .89). To assess whether glorification moderated either how the group 
composition, target of criticism, or the interaction between the two affected outcomes, 
eight items assessed participants’ glorification and, in a separate block, seven items 
assessed participants’ attachment (one of eight items excluded based on cross-loading). 
These items were included after assessing all other measures of primary interest, As in 
Studies 1-2, attachment was used as a covariate in all analyses with glorification.  
 Support for allowing the organization to present (M = 3.95, SD = 2.61). In 
response to the scenario describing local governments’ intention to use participants’ input 
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as part of their decision, a single item measured participants’ support for allowing the 
organization to present ranging from 1 (“Strongly Oppose”) to 9 (“Strongly Support”).  
Study 3 Results 
Before conducting main analyses, a GLM model with group composition and 
target of criticism as independent variables tested whether glorification and attachment 
(moderator and covariate, respectively) were affected by condition; neither were affected 
by either condition, ps > .500. GLM models tested group composition, target of criticism, 
glorification, and their interactions as predictors for each outcome. Glorification and 
attachment were each standardized so that the mean was zero, and a value of ‘1’ indicated 
those participants with scores one standard deviation above mean, and a value of ‘-1’ 
indicated those participants with scores one standard deviation below the mean. Thus, 
“high glorifiers” refers to those one standard deviation above the mean on glorification, 
whereas “low glorifiers” refers to those one standard deviation below the mean on 
glorification.  
Interactions were decomposed examining glorification as an independent variable 
predicting mediators and outcomes differentially across conditions; in the figures that 
follow, significant slopes (p < .05) are indicated with an asterisk, and marginal slopes (p 
≤ .10) are indicated with a plus sign.  In addition, contrasts between conditions among 
low glorifiers and between conditions among high glorifiers are noted in graphs of three-
way interactions when the p-value of the contrasts is .15 or lower. Three-way interactions 
were decomposed using Hayes’ Process Model 3 (2013).  
Anger 
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 Group composition did not significantly affect anger as a main effect, F(1, 223) = 
0.00, p = .984, ηp2 = .000. However, target of criticism F(8, 223) = 4.97, p = .027 ηp2 = 
.022 did affect anger. Anger was higher when the ingroup was the only target of criticism 
(M = 5.70, SD = 2.40) rather than when both groups were the target of criticism, (M = 
5.01, SD = 2.27). The two-way interaction between group composition and target of 
criticism was not significant, F(1, 223) = .29, p = .593, ηp2 = .001. 
Glorification significantly predicted higher levels of anger, b = .75, SE = .18, 
t(223) = 4.26, p < .001, whereas attachment did not significantly predict anger, b = .16, 
SE  = .17, t(223) = .93, p = .351. Moreover, glorification significantly interacted with 
group composition F(8, 223) = 4.98, p = .027, ηp2 = .022; glorification predicted 
significantly more anger when both groups were working together, b = 1.08, SE = .20, 
t(223) = 5.29, p < .001, but only marginally when the ingroup was working alone, b = 
.43, SE = .25, t(223) = 1.70, p = .091. Likewise, glorification significantly interacted with 
target of criticism, F(1, 223) = 5.63, p = .019, ηp2 = .025; glorification predicted 
significantly more anger when the target of criticism was just the ingroup, b = 1.10, SE = 
.22, t(223) = 5.00, p < .001, but only marginally when the target of criticism was both 
groups, b = .41, SE = .24, t(223) = 1.71, p = .089.  
 A significant three-way interaction between group composition, target of 
criticism, and glorification qualified these two-way interactions, F(8, 223) = 4.39, p = 
.037, ηp2 = .019. The two-way interaction between glorification and group composition 
was significant when both groups were the target of criticism, b = 1.26, SE = .44, t(223) = 
2.88, p = .004, but not when the target of criticism was only the ingroup, b = .04, SE = 
.38, t(223) = .099, p = .922. As Figure 2 shows, glorification predicted significantly 
  50 
higher levels of anger when the ingroup is working alone and criticizes only the ingroup, 
b = 1.08, SE = .31, t(223) = .31, p = .001, when both groups are working together and 
criticizing only the ingroup, b = 1.12, SE = .27, t(223) = 4.09, p < .001.  At the same 
time, glorification predicted significantly higher levels of anger when both groups are 
working together and criticizing both groups, b = 1.04, SE = .26, t(223) = 3.93, p < .001, 
but not when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing both groups, b = -.23, SE = .37, 
t(223) = -.60, p = .547.6  
Figure 2. Glorification predicting anger across conditions of group composition and 
target of criticism.  
 
 
                                                     
6 The three-way interaction is not significant when not excluding participants based on the group 
composition attention check, p = .237.  
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 Hope. Neither group composition, F(1, 223) = 1.59, p = .208, ηp2  = .007, nor 
target of criticism F(1, 223) = 2.19, p = .140, ηp2 = .010, significantly predicted hope as 
main effects.  
Glorification did not significantly predict hope, b = -.24, SE = .19, t(223) = -1.22, 
p = .223, whereas attachment did predict significantly less hope b = -.41, SE = .19, t(223) 
= -.41, SE = .19, t(223) = -2.13, p =  .034.  However, the two-way interaction between 
glorification and group composition, F(1, 223) = 6.55, p = .011, ηp2 = .029 was 
significant.  With both groups working together, glorification significantly predicted less 
hope, b = -.65, SE = .22, t(223) = -2.89, p = .004. However, when the ingroup was 
working alone, glorification did not significantly predict hope, b = .17, SE = .28, t(223) = 
.63, p = .532. Additionally, the interaction between glorification and target of criticism 
was also significant, F(1, 223) = 10.31, p = .002, ηp2 = .044. When both groups were the 
target of criticism, glorification did not significantly predict hope, b = .28, SE = .26, 
t(223) = 1.06, p = .288. In contrast, when the target of criticism was only the ingroup, 
glorification predicted significantly less hope, b = -.75, SE = .24, t(223) = -3.11, p = .002.  
Moreover, the three-way interaction between glorification, group composition, 
and target of criticism qualified these two-way interactions to predict hope, F(1, 223) = 
4.52, p = .035, ηp2 = .020. The interaction between glorification and group composition 
was significant when both groups were the target of criticism, b = -1.50, SE = .48, t(223) 
= -3.12, p = .002, but not when the target of criticism was only the ingroup, b = -.14, SE = 
.42, t(223) = -.32, p = .746. As Figure 3 shows, glorification significantly predicted less 
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hope when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.68, SE = 
.34, t(223) p = .046, and when both groups were working together and criticizing only the 
ingroup, b = -.82, SE = .30, t(223) = -2.73, p = .007. However, glorification predicted 
higher levels of hope when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, b 
= 1.03, SE = .41, t(223) = 2.51, p = .013, while glorification was not a significant 
predictor of hope when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, b 
= -.47, SE  = .29, t(223) = -1.63, p = .104.7  
 Figure 3.  Glorification predicting hope across conditions of group composition        
 and target of criticism.
 
                                                     
7 The three-way interaction became a trend when not excluding participants based on the group 
composition attention check, p = .101.  
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Support for the Organization 
 Neither group composition, F(8, 223) = .69, p = .408,  ηp2 = .003, nor target of 
criticism, F(8, 223) = .72, p = .399, ηp2 = .003, significantly predicted support as main 
effects. The two-way interaction between group composition and target of criticism was 
also not significant, F(8, 223) = .01, p = .920, ηp2 = .000. 
Glorification significantly predicted less support for having the organization 
speak, b = -1.03, SE = .20, t(223) = -5.25, p < .001, whereas attachment did not predict 
support for having the organization speak, b = .03, SE = .19, t(223) = .14, p = .892. The 
two-way interaction between glorification and group composition was not significant, 
F(1, 223) = 2.23, p = .137, ηp2 = .010, while the two-way interaction between 
glorification and target of criticism was marginally significant, F(1, 223) = 3.55, p = 
.061, ηp2 = .016. Glorification predicted less support most strongly when only the ingroup 
was the target of criticism, b = -1.34, SE = .25, t(223) = 5.46, p < .001; glorification also 
predicted less support when both groups were the target of criticism, but somewhat less 
strongly, b = -.73, SE = .27, t(223) = -2.74, p = .007. 
 These results were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between 
glorification, target of criticism, and group composition, F(1, 223) = 4.80, p = .030, ηp2 = 
.021.8 As Figure 4 shows, glorification significantly predicts less support when the 
ingroup is working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -1.45, SE = .35, t(223) = -
4.20, p < .001, and when both groups are working together and criticizing just the 
                                                     
8 The three-way interaction became marginal when not excluding participants based on the group 
composition attention check, p = .058.  
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ingroup, b = -1.23, SE = .30, t(223) = -4.02, p < .001.  Glorification also predicts less 
support when both groups are working together and criticizing both groups, b = -1.33, SE 
= .29, t(223) = -4.51, p < .001, but not when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing 
both groups, b = -.13, SE = .42, t(223) = -.30, p = .761.  
Figure 4.  Glorification predicting support for organization presenting across conditions 
group composition and target of criticism.
 
 
Agreement with Critique of the Organization 
 Neither group composition, nor target of criticism significantly affected 
agreement with the critique as main effects, ps > .500. Glorification significantly 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Glorification -1 SD Glorification +1 SD
Su
p
p
o
rt
 f
o
r 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
 P
re
se
n
ti
n
g
Both groups together criticizing both groups Both groups together criticizing ingroup
Ingroup  alone criticizing ingroup Ingroup alone criticizing both groups
*
*
p = .029
p = .019
p = .032
ns
ns
*
  55 
predicted higher levels of agreement with the critique, b = .52, SE = .18, t(223) = 2.85, p 
= .005, and b = .34, SE = .18, t(223) = 1.90, p = .059, respectively. None of the two-way 
interactions were significant, ps > .500. However, there was a significant three-way 
interaction between glorification, target of criticism, and group composition, F(1, 223) = 
5.38, p = .021, ηp2 = .024.9 The two-way interaction between group composition and 
glorification is significant when only the ingroup is the target of criticism, b = -.84, SE = 
.40, t(223) = -2.09, p = .038, but not when both groups are the target of criticism, b = .58, 
SE = .46, t(223) = 1.26, p = .210. As Figure 5 shows, glorification significantly predicts 
more agreement with the critique when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing only 
the ingroup, b = .95, SE = .32, t(223) = 2.93, p = .004, or when both groups work together 
and are criticizing both groups, b = .81, SE = .28, t(223) = 2.94, p = .004, but is not 
significant when both groups work together and criticize only the ingroup, b = .11, SE = 
.28, t(223) = .38, p = .708. Consistent with the model predicting anger and support for the 
organization presenting, glorification is not a significant predictor when the ingroup 
works alone and criticizes both groups, b = .24, SE = .39, t(223) = .60, p = .547.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
9 The three-way interaction became marginal when not excluding participants based on the group 
composition attention check, p = .058.  
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Figure 5. Glorification predicting agreement with critique across levels of group 
composition and target of criticism. 
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Support for Political Solutions 
 Support for a two-state solution. Neither group composition nor target of criticism 
affected support for a two-state solution, ps > .300. Glorification significantly predicted 
less support, b = -.88, SE = .17, t(223) = -5.07, p < .001, while attachment did not 
significantly predict support, b = -.25, SE = .17, t(223) = -1.46, p = .147. None of the 
two-way or three-way interactions were significant, ps > .500.  
 Support for a one-state solution. Group composition did not predict support for a 
one-state solution, F(1, 223) = .26, p = .213. However, framing the target of criticism as 
both groups (M = 4.23, SD = 2.51), rather than just the ingroup (M = 3.99, SD = 2.28) 
increased support for a one-state solution, F(1, 223) = 3.99, p = .047, ηp2 = .018. 
Glorification significantly predicted more support, b = .64, SE = .20, t(223) = 3.21, p = 
.002; attachment did not predict support, b = -.10, SE = .20, t(223) = -.51, p = .609. There 
was a trend towards a two-way interaction between glorification and group composition, 
F(1, 223) = 2.61, p = .108, ηp2 = .012. None of the other two-way or three-way 
interactions were significant, ps > .500. 
 Support for negotiations with Palestinians. Neither the main effect of group 
composition nor the main effect of target of criticism significantly affected support for 
negotiations, ps > .130. Glorification significantly predicted less support for negotiations, 
b = -.65, SE = .19, t(223) = -3.50, p < .001, whereas attachment did not predict support 
for negotiations, b = -.07, SE = .18, t(223) = -.36, p = .721. None of the two-way 
interactions were significant, ps > .300. However, the three-way interaction between 
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glorification, target of criticism, and group composition was significant, F(1, 223) = 4.29, 
p = .040, ηp2 = .019. The two-way interaction between glorification and group 
composition becomes significant when both groups are the target of criticism, b = -.93, 
SE = .46, t(223) = -2.01, p = .045, but is not significant when just the ingroup is the target 
of criticism, b = .34, SE = .41, t(223) = .847, p = .398. As Figure 6 shows, glorification 
significantly predicts less support for negotiations when the ingroup is working alone and 
criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.86, SE = .33, t(223) = -2.64, p = .009, and when both 
groups are working together and criticizing both groups, b = -1.08, SE = .28, t(223) = -
3.88, p < .001. However, when both groups are working together and criticizing only the 
ingroup, glorification marginally predicts support for negotiations, b = -.52, SE = .29, 
t(223) = -1.80, p = .073, and glorification does not significantly predict support for 
negotiations when the ingroup is working alone and criticizing both groups, b = -.15, SE 
= .39, t(223) = -.37, p = .709.  
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Figure 6. Glorification predicting support for negotiations across conditions.  
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glorification predicted outcomes differentially across conditions because of 
glorification’s differential effects on anger and hope across conditions. Model 12 of 
Hayes’s (2013) Process with 95% confidence intervals and 5,000 bootstrapping samples 
tested the hypothesis that differences in levels of hope and anger among low and high 
glorifiers explained the interactions between group composition and target of criticism in 
predicting (a) support for having the organization speak (b)  agreement with the critique 
and (c) support for negotiations. For each of these outcomes, glorification was treated as 
the independent variable, with group composition as the first moderator (coding the 
ingroup as ‘0’ and both groups working together as ‘1’), and target as the second the 
moderator (coding the ingroup as ‘0’ and both as ‘1’). As in all GLM analyses, 
attachment was included as a covariate.  
 Predicting support for having the organization speak.  The moderated indirect 
effect of the three-way interaction was significant via both anger (indirect effect of 
highest order interaction), b = -.53, boot SE = .29, [LLCI: -1.1635, ULCI: -.0363] and 
hope (indirect effect of highest order interaction), b = -.50, boot SE = .25, [LLCI: -
1.0804, ULCI: -.0771]. Glorification decreased support indirectly via (increasing) anger 
when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.44, boot SE = 
.15, [LLCI: -.7861, ULCI: -.2014], when both groups were working together and 
criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.46, SE = .15, [LLCI: -.8274, ULCI: -.2156], and when 
both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, b = -.43, boot SE = .14, 
[LLCI: -.7311, ULCI: -.1963], but it was not significant when the ingroup was working 
alone and criticizing both groups, b = .09, boot SE  = .17, [LLCI: -.2692, ULCI: .3908].  
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The indirect effect via hope was likewise significant when the ingroup was 
working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.27, boot SE = .15, [LLCI: -.6149, 
ULCI: -.0232], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, 
b = -.32, boot SE = .13, [LLCI: -.6234, ULCI: -.1109]. The indirect effect via hope was 
not significant when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, b = -
.18, boot SE = .12, [LLCI: -.4544, ULCI: .0380], and it was significant in the opposite 
direction when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, b = .40, boot 
SE = .21, [LLCI: .0082, ULCI: .8211].     
 Predicting agreement with the critique.  The moderated indirect effect of the 
three-way interaction was significant via both anger, (indirect effect of highest order 
interaction) b = .50, boot SE = .24, [LLCI: .0527, ULCI: 1.0092] and hope, (indirect 
effect of highest order interaction) b = .37, boot SE = .21, [LLCI: .0134, ULCI: .8217]. 
Glorification increased agreement indirectly via (increased) anger when the ingroup was 
working alone and criticizing only the ingroup, b = .44, boot SE  = .13, [LLCI: . 2051, 
ULCI: .7114], when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, 
b = .45, boot SE = .13, [LLCI: .2245, ULCI: .7370], and when both groups were working 
together and criticizing both groups, b = .42, boot SE = .12, [LLCI: .2069, ULCI: .6839]. 
This indirect effect was not significant, however, when the ingroup was working alone 
and criticizing both groups, b = -.09, boot SE = .16, [LLCI: -.3840, ULCI: .2558].  
The indirect effect via hope was significant when the ingroup was working alone 
and criticizing only the ingroup, b = .18, boot SE = .10, [LLCI: .0130, ULCI:.4278], 
when both groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, b = .22, boot 
SE = .09, [LLCI: .0806, ULCI: .4291].  The indirect effect via hope was not significant 
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when both groups were working together and criticizing both groups, b = .13, boot SE = 
.08, [LLCI: -.0161, ULCI: .3165], and it was significant in the opposite direction when 
the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, b = -.28, boot SE = .15, 
[LLCI: -.5967, ULCI: -.0163].     
Predicting support for negotiations with Palestinians.  The indirect effect of the 
three-way interaction on support for negotiations via anger was significant, (indirect 
effect of highest order interaction) b = -.44, boot SE = .22, [LLCI: -.9643, ULCI: -.0730], 
yet the indirect effect via hope was not (indirect effect of highest order interaction), b = -
.15, boot SE = .15, [LLCI: -.6062, ULCI: .0251]. Glorification predicted support for 
negotiations by increasing anger when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing 
only the ingroup, b = -.39, boot SE = .13, [LLCI: -.7134, ULCI: -.1646], when both 
groups were working together and criticizing only the ingroup, b = -.40, boot SE = .13, 
[LLCI: -.7162, ULCI: -.1822], and when both groups were working together and 
criticizing both groups, b = -.37, boot SE = .12, [LLCI: -.6417, ULCI: -.1681], but not 
when the ingroup was working alone and criticizing both groups, b = .08, boot SE = .15, 
[LLCI: -.2203, ULCI: .3731].  
Study 3 Discussion 
 Study 3 tested how the group composition of a peace activist organization and the 
perceived target of its criticism might predict support for the organization and its 
activities, and how glorification is likely to moderate these effects. Study 3 demonstrated 
that support for the activist organization depended not only on its composition and 
perceived target(s) of its criticism, but on how much participants glorified the ingroup.  
Glorification becomes especially (positively) predictive of anger and (negatively) hope 
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when both groups are working together, and when the ingroup is the only target of 
criticism. In the cases of both anger and hope, spreading criticism to both groups 
attenuates the impact of glorification. When the ingroup is working alone to criticize both 
groups, the relationship between glorification and hope reverses, such that higher levels 
of glorification predict more hope. The outcome of support for the organization 
presenting follows a different but similar pattern; across conditions glorification predicts 
less support, except for when the ingroup is working alone to criticize both groups.  
Agreement with the critique and support for negotiations with Palestinians both follow 
different but similar patterns; glorification is less predictive when the ingroup is working 
alone to criticize both groups.  
 Linking research on rejection of ingroup members of join outgroups (Travaglino 
et al., 2014) to research on glorification, this demonstrates that those who strongly glorify 
the ingroup are especially sensitive to ingroup members working with outgroup members. 
Connecting this to research on the role of glorification in shaping how people protect the 
ingroup’s moral image (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010) and research on sensitivity to criticism 
of the ingroup (e.g., Hornsey et al., 2002), this research shows that glorifiers react most 
negatively when both groups work together to criticize just the ingroup. However, it also 
shows that that critiquing the outgroup in addition can attenuate the negative reactions of 
those who strongly glorify the ingroup.     
Beyond direct effects, Study 3 also showed support for the hypothesis that anger 
and hope (see Halperin & Pilskin, 2015) would mediate the interactive relationships 
between glorification, group composition, and target of criticism. Glorification decreased 
support for allowing the organization to present when both groups were working together 
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or when the ingroup was working alone and critiquing the ingroup by increasing anger 
and decreasing hope. Likewise, glorification predicted stronger agreement with the 
critique of the organization when both groups were working together and criticizing both 
groups or when the ingroup was criticizing only the ingroup, and it did so by increasing 
anger and decreasing hope (or increasing hope in the case of the ingroup working alone 
and criticizing both groups, although this finding should be taken with caution without a 
significant direct effect of glorification in that condition). Glorification decreased support 
for negotiations by increasing anger when both groups were working together; it 
increased agreement with the critique when the ingroup was working alone to critique 
just the ingroup by increasing anger.   
At the same time, and consistent with Studies 1-2, Study 3 did not significantly 
impact support for specific political solutions to end the conflict. Thus, whereas the group 
composition of an activist organization and the way it targets its criticism may shape 
people’s openness to peace activists having an opportunity to voice their views, and may 
even affect openness to negotiations with Palestinians, these factors seem unlikely to 
affect people’s support for specific solutions, such as a one-state solution or a two-state 
solution.   
These patterns highlight the importance of people’s preconceived beliefs in the 
conflict (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2011). Slight differences in the framing of a manipulation 
are unlikely to change people’s preconceived support for peace activism or support for 
specific solutions to end the conflict, but they may alter the way in which other 
psychological factors, such as glorification (Roccas et al., 2008), shape their support. 
This may explain why group composition and target of criticism do not interact 
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independent of glorification; rather, the way in which they interact depends upon how 
strongly participants glorify the ingroup. 10  
It is also possible that people’s preconceived beliefs in the conflict may inform 
their responses to critiques of the activist organization.  Even though people high in 
glorification tended to be more likely to agree with critiques of the organization, it is 
possible that those who do not strongly glorify the ingroup agree with the critiques for a 
variety of reasons. For example, they may perceive the organization as having naïve 
perceptions of possible solutions to the conflict because of how other members of the 
ingroup will receive them, expecting other ingroup members to react aversely.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
10 Additionally, inspection of the means from Study 3 using a mixed ANOVA (with group composition, 
target of criticism, and their interaction testing the difference between perceptions of the organization as 
critical of Israel and as critical of Palestinians as repeated measures)  suggest that, across conditions, 
participants generally perceived that the organization was more critical of Israel than of Palestinians, F(1, 
228) = 191.52, p < .001, suggesting that although the manipulation stating that the organization was 
critical of both groups increased participants’ beliefs that the organization was critical of Palestinians, 
participants still generally perceived the organization as most critical of Israel. This may reflect 
participants’ motivation to be sensitive to criticism of their ingroup, which becomes especially important 
in contexts of protracted conflict (Bar-Tal et al., 2012). 
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CHAPTER 5  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This dissertation research shows that glorification predicts negative responses to 
activism to end intergroup conflict, and in particular when it takes the form of intergroup 
solidarity, where both groups are working together. Study 3 showed direct evidence that 
glorification moderates how people react to intergroup solidarity, and also showed 
evidence that having both groups criticize both groups may attenuate the relationship 
between glorification and outcomes reflecting support for an activist organization.  
Taken together, these findings address the need for research on the psychological 
factors that impact whether people react with support or backlash to peace activism 
(Louis, 2009). It does so in a context of protracted conflict whereby people are especially 
prone to cling to an image of their group as moral and unified (Bar-Tal et al., 2012). The 
findings of Study 3 in particular have important implications for theory and spur new 
directions for future research.    
This research shows evidence that whether people support or react with backlash 
to intergroup solidarity in activism to end intractable conflict is dependent on at least 
three factors: how they identify with the ingroup (e.g., Roccas et al., 2008) whether the 
activist organization includes members of both groups working together or just the 
ingroup working alone; and how the organization directs its criticism.   As such, these 
findings contribute to theory on indirect exposure to outgroups (e.g., Leshem et al., 2016; 
O’Brien et al., in press; Saguy & Halperin, 2014), defensiveness against criticism of the 
ingroup (Ariyanto et al., 2010; Hornsey et al., 2002), emotions in protracted conflict 
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(Halperin & Pilskin, 2015), and distinct modes of social identification (Leidner et al., 
2010; Roccas et al., 2006; 2008).  
In particular, this dissertation research shows that the extent to which people view 
their ingroup as superior and revere deference to its norms (e.g., glorification) predicts 
aversive reactions towards activist organizations working to resolve conflict with the 
outgroup. This finding itself is not surprising, because peace activists are expressly 
defying the ingroup’s norms and authorities, and at least implying that the ingroup has 
erred. However, as Study 3 shows, those who glorify their ingroup strongly are 
particularly sensitive to members of their ingroup working with the outgroup. This links 
research on glorification (Roccas et al., 2008) with research showing that group members 
reject deviants (Hutchison & Abrams, 2003; Schacter, 1951), especially those who 
strongly identify with the ingroup (Hutchison & Abrams, 2003), and especially when 
those deviants leave the ingroup to join an outgroup with whom they are in competition 
(Travaglino et al., 2014), demonstrating that specifically glorification rather than ingroup 
identification generally (e.g., Hutchison & Abrams, 2003) predicts more negative 
reactions to those defying group norms by working with an outgroup.  
The findings from Study 3 also raise important questions regarding those who do 
not glorify their ingroup strongly. These findings suggest that those who do not strongly 
glorify their ingroup are those who are most likely to react positively to intergroup 
solidarity. However, in contrast to findings on sensitivity to criticism of the ingroup (e.g., 
Ariyanto et al., 2010), low glorifiers may actually react negatively to ingroup members 
who criticize the outgroup, rather than simply responding negatively to outgroup 
members who criticize the ingroup. Their responses towards an activist organization of 
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just their ingroup members criticizing just the ingroup were more positive than their 
responses towards an activist organization of ingroup members criticizing both the 
ingroup and the outgroup. Whereas high glorifiers are generally defensive against threats 
to the ingroup’s moral image (e.g., Leidner et al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2006), this could 
suggest that low glorifiers may even want their ingroup to take responsibility for conflict, 
or at least express concern about the outgroup receiving criticism. Future research should 
test mechanisms explaining why those who do not strongly glorify their ingroup react 
more positively on certain outcomes to the ingroup being the only target of criticism. 
As in Study 2, the rate of participants who did not pass attention checks in Study 
3 also point to important insights for future studies in this program of research. Of 
particular concern was the rate of participants who did not pass the attention check 
regarding the target of criticism. Supplementary analyses indicate that whereas 
participants who did not pass this attention check and the attention check on group 
composition administered at the end of the study were significantly lower on attachment 
than those who did pass, even excluding those participants who did not pass the group 
composition attention check, those who did not pass the target of criticism were still 
marginally lower on attachment. People who were low on attachment may also have been 
less engaged in this study, and thus tired towards the end. This could explain why so 
many people did not pass this attention check regarding target of criticism. However, the 
continuous measure of perceived criticism shows evidence that this manipulation 
generally increased perceptions of the organization as critical of the outgroup.  In future 
research to prepare for publication, I am considering a study to replicate the two-way 
interactions between group composition and glorification, adding measures to build upon 
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these findings of Study 3 and also address the study’s methodological limitations. For 
example, although I would not add the same attention check used in the current research 
to directly follow the manipulation, adding a continuous measure of perceptions of group 
composition, similar to the continuous measure of perceived criticism, could indicate 
whether the manipulation was effective without making clear the study purpose. In Study 
1, the rate of participants who did not pass the attention check were not particularly high 
except in the outgroup condition. In Study 2, they were high in the outgroup and ingroup 
conditions, but since there was generally a low number of participants in this study, there 
was reason to suspect that the rate of participants who did not pass would decrease.   
Although each of these studies improved upon the prior in some way, 
methodological flaws may point to the strength of the context and participants’ prior 
experiences. Asking participants to “imagine” a peace activist is not strong enough to 
impact their reactions to those peace activist organizations. In hindsight, and partly based 
on the attention check, the outgroup condition likely left many participants confused in 
Study 2, and so this condition was eliminated for subsequent studies. In Study 3, 
regardless of whether it was explicitly stated that the organization was critical of both 
Israeli and Palestinian policies and actions, participants perceive that the organization is 
more critical of Israel than of Palestinians, perhaps reflecting a general tendency to be 
sensitive to criticism of the ingroup in contexts of protracted conflict (e.g., Bar-Tal et al., 
2012).  
This could point to a direction for future research. For example, whereas past 
research shows that representations of groups as belonging to one inclusive group can 
lead to more favorable representations of formerly outgroup members (e.g., Gaertner, 
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Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994),  and that group members have more 
negative evaluations of former ingroup members who leave the ingroup to join an 
outgroup (Travaglino et al., 2014), representations of ingroup members working with 
outgroup members could lead to perceptions of ingroup members as belonging to the 
outgroup. This could depend on glorification, whereby those who strongly glorify the 
ingroup and are thus sensitive to the defiance of norms recategorize ingroup members 
working with the outgroup as outgroup members and evaluate them more negatively.  
Future research should also address how those high and low in glorification react 
differentially to criticism. For example, whereas past research has shown that people 
evaluate ingroup members criticizing the ingroup more positively than outgroup members 
because they perceive critics from the ingroup as constructive (Hornsey, Trembath, & 
Gunthorpe, 2004), how people perceive the consequences of criticism could depend on 
their levels of glorification (Roccas et al., 2008). Those who do not strongly glorify the 
ingroup may perceive criticism as constructive, whereas those who strongly glorify the 
ingroup perceive criticism as damaging to the ingroup.   
Conclusion 
This dissertation integrates theory on distinct modes of social identity (Leidner et 
al., 2010; Roccas et al., 2008) with research on deviance of group norms (Schacter, 1951; 
Travaglino et al., 2014) and exposure to group-based criticism from ingroup and 
outgroup members during conflict (Ariyanto et al., 2010; Saguy & Halperin, 2014). It 
shows that, in a context of protracted conflict, high glorifiers in particular are sensitive to 
learning about activism to advocate ending the conflict, particularly to members of their 
ingroup working with an outgroup, and particularly when the criticism targets exclusively 
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their ingroup. Future research will seek to replicate and extend findings regarding the 
differential effects of both groups working together among those who strongly glorify 
their ingroup vs. those who do not, as well as the reduction of backlash among those who 
glorify their ingroup when only ingroup members are involved and both groups are the 
target of criticism. 
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APPENDIX: MEASURES 
Support for political solutions 
A two-state solution based on the pre-1967 lines, with all settlements in the West Bank    
evacuated to the pre-1967 lines and Jerusalem divided (solution reflecting the most 
compromise) 
 
A one-state solution, in which Israel remains a Jewish state with Palestinian enclaves 
(solution involving least compromise to the ingroup). 
 
Glorification (Full Scale from Study 1): 
On the next page, please report your opinion on the role of Israel in the world. 
Remember, there are no right or wrong answers.  
Other nations can learn a lot from us. 
In today’s world, the only way to know what to do is to rely on the leaders of our nation.  
The IDF is the best army in the world.  
One of the important things that we have to teach children is to respect the leaders of our 
nation.  
Relative to other nations, we are a very moral nation.  
It is disloyal for Israelis to criticize Israel. 
Israel is better than other nations in all respects.  
There is generally a good reason for every rule and regulation made by our national 
authorities.  
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Attachment (Full Scale from Study 1): 
On the next page, we are interested in how you perceive yourself as an Israeli citizen.  
Again, there are no right or wrong answers.  
I love Israel. 
Being an Israeli is an important part of my identity.  
It is important to me to contribute to my nation.  
It is important to me to view myself as an Israeli.  
I am strongly committed to my nation.  
It is important to me that everyone will see me as an Israeli.  
It is important for me to serve my country.  
When I talk about Israelis I usually say “we” rather than “they.” 
 
Emotions towards organization in Studies 2-3 
In the next set of questions we would like to ask you about the emotions you feel when 
thinking about (Israelis working for a Solution/Israelis and Palestinians working for a 
solution). To do so please move the slider below anywhere between “Not at all” and 
“Absolutely”.   When thinking about (name of organization) I feel…11 
...angry 
...irritated 
...hopeful 
...annoyed 
...irate 
                                                     
11 Other emotions, including several items assessing fear, and one item meant to be used as a reverse for 
“hope’ were also measured. 
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...betrayed 
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